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ABSTRAC
A
CT
With inccreasing num
mber and sev
verity of atttacks, monit oring ingresss and egresss network trraffic is
becoming
g essential everyday
e
tassk. Intrusion
n detection systems aree the main ttools for cap
pturing
and searcching network traffic forr potential harm.
h
Signatture-based intrusion dettection systeems are
the mostt widely used, and theey simply use
u a patterrn matchingg algorithmss to locate attack
signaturees in intercep
pted network
k traffic. Patttern match ing algorithm
ms are very expensive in
n terms
of runnin
ng time and memory ussage, leaving
g intrusion d
detection sysstems unablee to detect attacks
in real-tiime. We pro
opose a Bloo
om filters optimized W
Wu-Manber p
pattern matcching algorithm to
speed up
p intrusion detection.
d
The Bloom fiilter program
ms the hash
h table into a vector, w
which is
quickly queried
q
to exclude
e
unn
necessary sea
arches. On average hassh table seaarches are aavoided
10.6% off the time. The
T proposeed algorithm
m achieves a best-case sp
peedup of 66% and worrst-case
speedup of 33% over Wu-Manberr at the costt of 0.33% m
memory usagge increase.
k security, in
ntrusion deteection system
ms, pattern matching, W
Wu-Manber, Bloom
Keyworrds: network
filters

INTRO
ODUCT
TION1
Internet connectivity
y has becom
me essential and
a
a basic requirement
r
for any kin
nd of busineess.
More app
plications require Intern
net connectiv
vity
to installl, update, ru
un or functio
on correctly. In
addition, cloud comp
puting, socia
al networks and
a
Internet of things ha
ave placed a lot of priv
vate
data at risk
r
of being
g exposed to
o the increassing
number of
o high skillled attackerss. The number
and comp
plexity of atttacks have been
b
increassing
at an alarming ratee against ba
anks, hospita
als,
governmeents and other com
mpanies. New
N
vulnerabilities, exp
ploits and attacks are

Proceedings of the 2nd Worrld Symposium on
o Web Applications
king (WSWAN’2
2015) (2015), IEE
EE.
and Network

1
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annou
unced daily at an alarm
ming rate (R
Roberts,
2000)).
In
ntrusion dettection systtems (IDS) are a
widelly-used contrrol measure to inspect n
network
traffi c in order tto detect an
nd sometimes block
attaccks. IDSs are classsified baseed on
deplooyment into two main ttypes: netwoork and
host- based systeems. Network-based in
ntrusion
detecction system
ms (NIDS) sccan all ingreess and
egres s traffic loooking for attacks an
nd are
generrally seen in
n the form of dedicateed IDS
appliance. While host-based intrusion deetection
system
ms (HIDS) on the other hand, are a
unning on a specific hoost that
softw
ware agent ru
moni tors all acctivity look
king for maalicious
eventts. Hardw
ware IDS appliances cost
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hundreds of thousands of dollars, that is why
software-based
IDS
running
on
PC
workstations
remain
widely
deployed.
However, software-based systems are unable to
keep up with the ever-increasing Internet speed
(Zheng, Cai, Zhang, Wang, & Yang, 2015).
Unlike IDSs, Intrusion prevention systems
(IPS) are a new breed of proactive IDS that
are deployed inline to detect malicious activity
in real-time and take corrective action. IPSs
can log the activities, alarm administrators, or
drop connections. They have not been widely
adopted due to users not favoring automatic
dropping of sessions or packets.
Intrusion detection systems are categorized
based on the technique into: signature and
anomaly-based (Aldwairi, 2006). Signaturebased intrusion detection systems detect
known attacks by searching network traffic for
attack signatures. They generally use
traditional pattern matching algorithms and
yield better speed and accuracy compared to
anomaly detection. The signatures are
manually written after security analysts study
the captured attack or malware code looking
for invariant parts. The manually developed
signatures are a big disadvantage in terms of
signatures accuracy and the fact that it takes a
considerable amount of time to provide a
signature after a new attack is detected
(Jirachan, & Piromsopa, 2015). On the other
hand, anomaly detection builds a profile of the
normal system behavior during the training
phase. It uses common machine learning
classifiers to extract features from new traffic
and classify them into benign or malicious. The
profiles are based on statistical analysis to
capture specific behavior patterns such as
system calls. Proprietary rule based languages
are used to capture those profiles in isolated
setup. It is true that anomaly-based IDSs
detect new attacks, however they are
considerably slow and generate more false
positives and negatives as opposed to
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signature-based (Aldwairi, Khamayseh, & AlMasri, 2015).
Signature-based IDSs continue to dominate
the market, with Snort being one of the most
commonly deployed systems (Roesch, 1999).
Snort (2016) has been the target of numerous
studies and became the de facto among
researchers working to speed up pattern
matching algorithms for IDS. Simply, Snort
inspects network traffic trying to match
packets against predefined rules. It has many
other capabilities such as packet capture and
reassembly (Lam, Mitzenmacher, & Varghese,
2010). However, this work is concerned only
with pattern matching, which dominates
Snorts performance. Antonatos, Anagnostakis,
and Markatos (2004) found that pattern
matching algorithms consume up to 70% of
Snort running time. To make matters worse, as
new attacks arise, the number of signatures
grows exacerbating the performance issue.
Snort rules examine the packets header and
search the packets payload for attack
signatures (Aldwairi, & Alansari, 2011).
However, the majority of the rules contain one
or more signatures. Almost 87% of Snort rules
contain signatures to match against (Aldwairi,
Conte, & Franzon, 2004). Therefore, there is
still a need to speedup pattern matching for
intrusion detection (Gharaee, Seifi, &
Monsefan, 2014).
There is surge of studies to improve
pattern matching for intrusion detection
whether
in
hardware
or
software.
Dharmaprikar, Krishnamurthy, Sproull, &
Lockwood, (2004) proposed hardware parallel
Bloom filters to exclude benign packets. But
because Bloom filters only work with fixed
length signatures, they were forced to use
many parallel Bloom filters. Bearing in mind
that Snort signatures lengths can be over 1000
characters, this solution ends up being very
expensive in terms of memory. We will show
later that each Bloom vector can grow up to
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1MB in size, having thousands of those is not
quite efficient. It is worth pointing out that
Bloom filters are used in a more efficient way
in this paper. We program only the B
character prefixes of the sparse hash table to
avoid unnecessary expensive hash table
searches. Consequently, one Bloom filter is
used as opposed to one for each signature’s
length in case of Dharmaprikar et al. (2004).
Yang, Xu, & Cui (2006) improved WuManber (QWM) using Quick Search (QS)
algorithm (Sunday, 1990) and mismatch
information, to increase the shift values. Quick
Search is basically used to find if a packet
contains a prefix of an attack signature. If a
prefix is found QWM then uses Wu-Manber
(WM) to verify the match. To achieve that a
fourth table is added, the HEAD table. The
table decides if the first two characters of a
matching window are the prefix of a pattern.
QWM was designed to outperform WM for
Chinese texts with large alphabets as opposed
to network traffic with limited character set. In
addition, a considerable memory overhead is
added due to the additional HEAD table.
WM+ by Xunxun, Binxing, Lei, and Yu
(2005) merged Aho-Corasick (AC) and WuManber algorithms to improve the shift table.
WM+ algorithm derived a prefix automata
scanning from AC instead of the ordinary hash
table based pattern matching. In addition, a
filtering algorithm was used along with the
finite automata to skip the bad characters in
order to speed up the search. Unfortunately,
for longer patterns lengths the memory
consumption of WM+ is significantly larger
than WM. On top of that, the finite automata
construction adds a considerable overhead.
Older Snort versions implemented AhoCorasick, and a lot of researches were
performed on optimizing AC automata. Liu,
Chen, Wu, and Wu (2011) proposed a finite
automata with extended character set to
reduce the number of states, which is the main
© 2016 ADFSL
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disadvantage of AC. They used auxiliary
variables to compress the number of states
while maintaining one memory access per byte.
Newer versions of Snort opted out to
implement a modified Wu-Manber (MWM)
(Beale, Baker, Esler, & Northcutt, 2007). WM
is more attractive because of the smaller
memory requirements and better performance
for longer strings. That is possible because
WM is conservative in that the maximum shift
possible is m–B+1, which depends on the
minimum string length. MWM examines the
suffixes of the block in order to change the
default shift value. The modified WM can have
a larger shift equivalent to the block size if the
no pattern contains any block suffixes.
To overcome the degrading performance as
the number of signatures increases, Peng,
Wang, and Xue (2014) proposed a new
enhanced Wu-Manber. They optimized WM by
minimizing number of candidate patterns in
the HASH table and using binary search to
look for candidate patterns in the index table
to cut the searching time. Experimental results
showed that in case of large pattern sets (>
5
3×10 ), the enhanced algorithm is more
efficient than the classical WM, MWM, and
TFD algorithms. This is due to the fact that in
the enhanced algorithm, the hash table was
well balanced and the binary search helped
reduce the search time.
Zhang (2016) modified WM to suit
matching short bit streams for wireless
communication protocols. The algorithm added
a new GSSHIFT table to determine the shift
distance when the SHIFT table returns zero.
They achieved speedup, over WM, of 1.6 times
for 5 bit patterns. However, the algorithm
scaled very poorly with string’s length, with no
improvement for strings longer than 64 bits.
Finally, Lee, Woo, and An (2016) modified
WM using multiple sub-patterns on multi-core
CPU. However, the modified algorithm had
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poor performance for large number of
signatures and did not improve time
proportional to the number of cores used.
This paper presents Exhaust: a modified
version of Wu-Manber with negligible
overhead. Exhaust is designed specifically to
speed up pattern matching for intrusion
detection systems to match higher network
speeds. The main contribution is to insert only
one Bloom filter to wither out unnecessary
hash table searches (Aldwairi, & AlKhamaiseh, 2015). It results in a considerable
improvement on the overall performance with
minimal overhead. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 explains the
basic knowledge required to understand the
problem. It explains Snort rules in full details,
pattern matching algorithms, Wu-Manber and
Bloom filters theory. Section 3 describes
Exhaust inner workings and details the
initialization and search phases. Section 4
brings forward a complete formal and
experimental validation of the proposed
algorithm using actual traffic traces and attack
signatures.

2. BACKGROUND
This section explains Snort and its rules
format. An example of actual Snort rules and
attack signatures is presented. Subsection 2
presents a pattern matching algorithms
overview and provides a thorough WM
explanation with preprocessing and search
examples using real Snort signatures. Finally, a
brief introduction to Bloom filters is set
forwards.

2.1 Snort
Snort is a popular open source IDS from
Sourcefire which has recently been acquired by
CISCO. We’re mostly concerned with Snorts’
rules that contain attack signatures. The rules
are in plaintext and describe set of conditions
for the packet’s header/payload to match. The
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rules’ headers field specifies the action to be
taken and provides values for the protocol
type, source and destination IP addresses and
port numbers. The options field contains more
than twenty-four keyword and value pairs,
such as: msg for the alert message, sid for
signature identification number, priority gives
rules’ severity level, and class-type to
categorize rules. The rules options also contain
several content, uricontent and pcre keywords
that specify attack signatures (Beale, Baker,
Esler, & Northcutt, 2007).
Figure 1 shows a redacted Snort v2.8 rule
from ddos.rules rule set. You can easily extract
the attack signature, “gOrave”, from the
content keyword. The rule is very easy to read:
fire an alert if any external TCP packet going
to any local machine on port 27665 while
containing the string “gOrave”. This rule
detects a well-known old DDoS attack called,
Trin00 (Dittrich, 2015).
(Kharbutli, Aldwairi, & Mughrabi (2012)
identified pattern matching to locate the
attack signatures in the packet payload, as the
main bottleneck. Despite Snort using the
fastest pattern matching available, it still lags
behind increasing network access speeds.
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any ->
$HOME_NET 27665 (msg:"DDOS Trin00
Attacker to Master default
password"; content:"gOrave";
classtype:attempted-dos; sid:234)
Figure
A sample matching
Snort rule
2.2 1.
Pattern

for IDS

Snort relies on exact pattern matching
algorithms and does not use regular
expressions for encoding signatures. Pattern
matching is classified into either single or
multiple pattern matching. Single pattern
matching must scan the packet once for each
signature in the dataset, which makes it
counterproductive. They are not used in IDS,
but it is a good introductory example to
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pattern matching. Boyer-Moore (BM) is one of
the most common single pattern matching
algorithms. In an effort to locate a match, it
places the pattern and packet side by side and
shifts the pattern by one position in the case of
mismatch. In the event of a match it moves to
match the next character from the pattern
with subsequent character from the packet.
The algorithm is fairly simple and inefficient,
because the search time grows linearly with the
packets’ and patterns’ lengths. Several
improvements over BM exist such as good and
bad character heuristics as well as BoyerMoore-Horspool (Boyer, & Moore, 1977).
On the other hand, multiple pattern
matching algorithms preprogram all patterns
into a table or tree and match all patterns at
the same time. The additional preprocessing
stage is the obvious drawback, but this pales in
comparison to the savings attained from
traversing the packet once. Aho-Corasick and
Wu-Manber are two of the fastest multiple
pattern algorithms to date.
In the preprocessing phase, AC builds a
trie based state machine from the set of
patterns to be matched (Aho, & Corasick,
1975). AC search time is linearly proportional
to the searched packet length and is not
affected by the number of characters in the
signatures. However, AC preprocessing time
and complexity increases exponentially with
the number of characters, which makes it ideal
only for short signatures. Moreover, the state
machine needs to be rebuilt every time a new
pattern is added to the signatures database.
Unfortunately, AC memory requirements scale
exponentially with increasing number of
signatures. Wu-Manber algorithm on the other
hand, is based on hash tables, which makes it
more attractive option compared to AC for
longer signatures (Wu, & Manber, 1994).

2.3. Wu-Manber algorithm

© 2016 ADFSL
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Wu-Manber relies on the same principles
used in Boyer-Moore algorithm (Boyer, &
Moore, 1977), but adds a block of B characters
and new data structure for more efficient
matching. Like all multiple pattern matching
algorithms, WM has two stages: preprocessing
and search. The preprocessing stage of the
algorithm starts by computing the minimum
length m of all patterns that are available
beforehand. Then it defines a block of B
characters used for matching window shifts.
The block size is recommended to be either
two or three. Then the algorithm builds three
tables during pattern preprocessing: shift,
hash, and prefix
The shift table is constructed by
computing the shift value for each substring of
size B taken from the first m characters of the
pattern. The shift table is a hash table where
the key is the signature substring and its value
is computed using the equation shift [key]=mq, where q denotes the right most location in
the pattern substring. The default value of this
table is defined by the equation shift [key] =
m-B+1. The shift value represents the number
of maximum characters to skip forward when a
mismatch occurs. The character blocks that
have a shift value of zero indicate a probable
match. All patterns that share those zero shifts
probable matches are programmed into the
hash table. The main purpose of the prefix
table is to make finding probable matches in
the hash table faster by hashing the prefixes of
those patterns. Additionally, it is used to
distinguish between the patterns that have the
same suffix but differ in the prefix.
The search starts by dividing the network
traffic traces into sliding window of size B.
Each time the search string of size B returns a
zero shift value when traversing the shift table,
the algorithm accesses the hash table and
searches the list of patterns associated with the
key to find the match.
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An example with actual signatures is
presented to better understand the algorithm.
Table 1 shows the shift table for the following
patterns extracted from the Snort FTP rule set
{RMD, XMKD, MDTM, MKD} for block size
of two characters, B=2. The minimum pattern
length is three characters, m=3 and the default
shift value is m–B +1, which equals 3–2+1 =
2. Take the block “DT”, which exists in pattern
“MDTM”. The shift value is m – q, where q is

the rightmost occurrence of DT in any pattern,
hence, shift [DT] is 3–2=1. On the other hand,
take block “MD”, which can be found in two
patterns “RMD” and “MDTM”. The shift [MD]
is 3–3=0 taken from pattern “RMD” and not
3–2=1 as in pattern “MDTM”. Figure 2 (a)
shows the hash table, which holds pointers to
the patterns that contain the probable
matching signatures.

Figure 2 (a). Wu-Manber hash table; (b) Wu-Manber search phase

Figure 2 (b) shows the step-by-step search
stage over the following hypothetical packet
“RTDTMXMKDDTS”
with
a
matching
window of three characters. In step one, WM
examines the first search window: “RTD”. The
two-character suffix for the search windows
“TD” is hashed to find the index to access the
shift table. The shift value for {TD} is two;
WM then shifts the search window by two to
become “DTM”. In step two, the hash value for
the block “TM” is zero, which means a
probable match. Therefore, WM searches the
hash table with the same index from hashing
“TM”. No match is found and that was a false
alarm. The default shift of two is applied
which makes the next search window “MXM”.
In step three the shift for “XM” is two making
the next search window “MKD”. In step four,
the shift value is zero for “KD”, the hash table
is searched and two matches are found
{XMKD} and {MKD}. A shift of two is
applied and the shift for “DT” is one. Step six,

Page 10

ends the search with the window reaching the
end of packet.
WM search time does not surge
significantly as the number and size of
signatures increase. On the contrary, the
average case performance beats all competing
algorithms for longer signatures. However,
while the overhead introduced by preprocessing
scales linearly with size and numbers of
signatures, it is still negligible compared to the
search time.
Table 1.
WM-Manber Shift Table
BC
Shift

MD
0

KD
0

MK
1

TM
0

DT
1

Others
2

2.4. Theory of Bloom filters
Bloom filters rely on a long binary vector
where a set of patterns can be programmed
and reprogrammed efficiently. The filter runs a
few hash functions on a set of patterns and
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sets the corresponding bits to the resulting
hash
values.
This
vector
represents
membership information on the programmed
patterns and consumes a lot less space as
opposed to the original dataset. The Bloom
vector can easily be probed to verify
membership. Simply run the same hash
functions on the new pattern and check the
corresponding bits. If they are not set then the
Bloom filters provides a 100% assurance that
the pattern is not a member of the original
patterns dataset programmed into the vector.
However, if the bits are set this means that
there is a chance the pattern is a member of
the original set (Bloom, 1970). That is, false
negatives are zero, which is exactly what we
need to verify a packet is clean without
performing expensive hash table search. On the
other hand, Bloom filters false positives rate, f,
is given by Eq. (1).
= 1−

(1)

Where, n is the number of strings
programmed into the Bloom filter, s represents
the vector size and k is the hash functions
number. The false positives rate can be
reduced by increasing the values of s and k to
be appropriate for the strings number n. In
addition, the value of s has to be larger than
the given size of the string set, n.
It is possible to have multiple strings
result in setting overlapping bits. Therefore,
deleting a string would be an issue, because it
resets the corresponding bits, which might
happen to be set by another string. Counting
Bloom filters (Fan, Cao, Almeida, & Broder,
2000) maintain a counter for each bit in the
bitmap corresponding to the number of
patterns that cumulatively set that bit.
Consequently, when a new pattern is inserted
or an old pattern is deleted the counter
corresponding to its hash values is incremented
or decremented. When the counter reaches
zero, the bit is cleared.
© 2016 ADFSL
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3. METHODOLOGY
We propose Exhaust: EXclude HAsh table
Unnecessary Search Time. We use the
counting Bloom filters 100% exclusion property
to eliminate unnecessary hash table searches.
Remember that most of network traffic is
benign and naturally it does not contain any
malicious signatures. Therefore, if we program
the Bloom filter with substrings, of size B,
from the pattern prefixes from the hash table
entries, then we can query the filter before we
search the hash table. Querying the Bloom
filter is a lot faster than searching the table.
This means we can save the time to search the
hash table for all clean traffic and we incur the
cost of running two hash functions. Remember
that a zero shift value from the shift table does
not necessarily mean a definite match. On the
contrary, quite often zero shifts are false
alarms caused by the small WM block size of
two or three. This small block size makes it
more coincidental that the search window and
the signature end up with the same suffix.
Those false alarms can be handled faster if a
Bloom filter is used to exclude those blocks
that are not in the hash table, cutting the time
to perform unnecessary searches for the large
hash table.
Therefore, the Bloom filter provides a more
accurate mechanism to determine probable
matches and help skip the majority of zero
shifts caused by benign traffic. We will prove
later that this significantly improves the WM
algorithm’s performance while adding a very
small memory overhead for the Bloom filter
and a negligible preprocessing time.
Algorithm
1
presents
Exhaust
preprocessing pseudo code, which is similar to
WM algorithm except for the additional Bloom
filter programming steps. First, the algorithm
starts by determining the minimum pattern
length, m. Then Exhaust populates the shift
table with the default shift value, of m – B +
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1. Both the shift and hash tables are accessed
by the same hash function index calculated on
the character block. Next, it computes the shift
values for all block substrings (x) of size B
used to fill the shift table. If the shift value is
zero, the corresponding entries in the hash and
prefix tables are entered. Additionally,
Exhaust programs the last B characters of
pattern
into
the
Bloom
filter.
The
programming is simply running the selected
hash functions on substring of size B and
setting the corresponding bits in the Bloom
vector.
Algorithm 2 present Exhaust’s search
stage, where a sliding a window of size (w) is
passed over the packet. For each sliding
window the index (i) for shift table is
calculated by running a hash function on the
suffix of B characters. If the shift[i] value is
not zero then slide the window by the shift
amount.
On the other hand, if the shift [i] value is
zero then we must search the hash and prefix
tables to verify and find the match. The Bloom
filter reduces the search time, by computing
two hash functions on the B character suffix
and examining the corresponding bits in the
Bloom vector. If the Bloom vector membership
is negative, then we skip the hash table search
and move to the next sliding window. If the
Bloom filter membership is positive then we
must search the hash and prefix tables to
verify the match.
The Bloom filters do not have false
negatives, which make them perfect to exclude
strings from the hash table. However, they
have false positives, which need to be reduced
to maximize the number of times Exhaust
skips the hash table. Therefore, we use two
distinct and pairwise independent hash
functions: SDBM and SAX. SDBM (Partow,
2015) hash is an algorithm used in the open
source SDBM project. It has a good
distribution for different datasets and when
Page 12

there is a high variance in the dataset
members. For a character c, the hash value is
calculated as shown by Eq. (2). SAX, on the
other hand, is simple hash function proposed
by Ramakrishna and Zobel (Ramakrishna, &
Zobel, 1997). It is very fast because of the use
of the common operations of shift, ADD and
XOR as shown by Eq. (3).
ℎ

= + ℎ

ℎ≪6 + ℎ

ℎ ≪ 16 − ℎ

ℎ= + ℎ

ℎ≪5 + ℎ

ℎ≫2

ℎ

(2)
(3)

Algorithm 1 Exhaust Initialization
1: procedure Initialize
2: for each pattern (P) in signatures set
3: if B < len(P) < m
4: m Å len(P)
5: end for
6: fill SHIFT [i]Å m – B + 1
7:
for every substring (x) of size B
8:
for each pattern (P)
9:
if x ϵ any P with last occurrence of q
10: SHIFT[i] Å m – q
11:
if SHIFT[i] = 0
12: fill(HASH)
13: fill(PREFIX)
14:
Bloom vector Å hashFcns(x)
15:
end for
16: end for
17: end procedure
18: procedure Initialize
19: for each pattern (P) in signatures set

Algorithm 2 Exhaust Search
1: procedure Search
2: for each sliding w until the end of packet
3: if HASH(hashFcns(last block of w)) != 0
4:
shift w by HASH(hashFcns(last block of w))
5:
else if w !ϵ Bloom vector
6:
shift w by 1
7:
else
8:
search HASH and PREFIX tables for exact match
9: end for
10: end procedure

4. RESULTS AND
ANALYSIS
We evaluate Exhaust’s performance through
simulations using actual Snort rules and
extremely malicious traffic traces representing
worst-case scenario. Subsection 1 presents the
details of the testing process and environment.
Subsection 2 lays out the metrics to be
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measured. Subsection 3 explains how Snort
attack signatures are extracted and cleansed,
while Section 4 analyzes the traffic traces.
Subsection 5 measures the number of times the
hash table search is skipped and compares the
Exhaust runtime to WM. Subsection 6
measures
the
overhead
in terms
of
preprocessing time and memory usage.
Subsection 7 suggests solutions to reduce the
Bloom filters false positives to further improve
Exhaust’s performance. Finally, Subsection 8
analyzes the algorithm complexity and
provides formal proof.

4.1. Test methodology and
environment
We perform the experiments on a PC
workstation with Intel Core 2 duo processor,
running at 1.83 GHz, with a L1 cache of 32
KB, L2 cache of 2 MB, and 1 GB of main
memory. We use Microsoft Visual Studio 2008
running on 32-bit Microsoft Windows 7
Professional.
To evaluate the algorithm’s performance,
we use actual network traffic traces and Snort
rules. The signatures and packets are stored
and read offline from files. Each experiment is
repeated five times and the average is
reported. Certain experiments require varying
the number of signatures or characters. To be
able to achieve that, signatures from different
Snort rules classes are combined together to
form eight sets of patterns. The first set
contains 500 patterns from Specific-Threats
class. The second set includes 1000 signatures
composed of the previous 500 in addition to
another 500 from Backdoor class and other
classes. We incrementally pile signatures to
end up with eight sets containing signatures
ranging between 500 and 4000.

4.2. Evaluation metrics
The best metrics to evaluate the performance
enhancement is the run time and speedup over
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WM algorithm. We exert every effort to
accurately measure time by averaging five
readings. However, since time measurements
are not bullet proof we believe that counting
the number of times we skip the hash table is a
better metric. Therefore, we define the HAC
and HSC metrics to measure the number of
times Exhaust skips the hash table search.
Where, HAC is the hash table access count
and HSC is the hash table skips count. An
access means that the Bloom filter gives a
probable match, that is, it fails to avoid hash
table search. A skip happens when the Bloom
filter successfully skips the hash table search.
Naturally, the higher the HSC the better
because of the savings from skipping the hash
table search as opposed to just computing two
hash functions.
In addition, to better understand the
performance improvements we calculate the
hash table access ratio (HAR), and the hash
table skip ratio (HSR). The normalized ratios
are calculated according to Eq. (4) and Eq.
(5). Moreover, to measure the Bloom filter
overhead we report the added preprocessing
time and memory. Finally, we analyze the false
positives resulting from adding the Bloom
filter.
=

(4)

=

(5)

4.3. Signatures extraction
We develop a script to extract the values of
content keywords from Snort 2.8.4.1 rules
database released in July 2009 (Snort rules,
n.d.). We elected to use this version because it
contains more attack signatures (9,945 rules)
as opposed to the 2017 Snort v2.9 community
rules. The latter includes only 3518 rules,
because of the cleansing performed after
Cisco's Talos participated in authoring Snort
rules. We believe release 2.8.4.1 serves as a
worst-case test dataset for Exhaust.
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We only extract signatures from content
and uricontent keywords as the pcre keyword
contains regular expressions and not an exact
match. If a rule contains more than one
content keyword, the script merges those
patterns with space character as a delimiter.
All signatures are subsequently converted into
hexadecimal equivalent to the ASCII codes.
This way Exhaust is able to handle all 256
possibilities including nonprintable characters.

4.4. Traffic analysis
We use DEFCON17 Capture the Flag (CTF)
game packet traces from 2009 (DEFCON
Organization, n.d.). Capture the Flag is a
hacker game where teams compete to capture
computers of other teams while defending their
own computers. The traces from the game are
collected and made available to the public. We
use those traces to gauge the worst-case
performance of the new algorithm.
Our analysis shows that 51.62% of all
packets in the 78 CTF traces have payload. Of
those traces, we pick the ten that contains the
highest percentage of packets with payload to
represent the worst case. Table 2 shows the
most malicious traces with total number of
packets, number of packets with payload, and
the percentage. The percentage of malicious
content for the picked traces averages 57%
which will result in a lot of signature matches.
The numbers in Table 2 exclude fragmented
packets.

Table 2. Most Malicious Traffic

Trace
Number of
No
Packets
8
671143
13
683770
14
676657
46
494466
49
331508
50
326101
51
299746
52
277840
53
275483
54
311546
Average

Packets with
Payload
383233
398615
389705
280123
188722
190173
168660
159299
155846
178480

Percentage
57%
58%
58%
57%
57%
58%
56%
57%
57%
57%
57%

4.5. Speedup
First, we measure the HAC and HSC. That is
the number of times the hash table is accessed
and skipped. Figure 3 (a) shows the hash table
access and skip counts for increasing number of
signatures for trace number 8. Obviously, as
the as the number of attack signatures
increases, there will be more matches within
the trace. Therefore, the number of hash tables
accesses and skips increases. There is
noticeable increase in savings as the number of
number of signatures increases.
A more accurate picture is provided by
Figure 3 (b), which presents the HAR and
HSR for the same traffic trace. That is, the
normalized hash table access and skip ratios.
On average the hash table is skipped between
2.6% and 13.7% of the time with an average
savings of 10.6%. The most important
conclusion to draw from the figure is that the
skip percentage is not correlated to the number
of signatures. In other words, Exhaust
performance remains fixed regardless of the
number of attacks it searches for.
Next, we fix the number of signatures at
3500 and plot the HAR and HSR in Figure 4
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(a). It iss evident that the skip ratio is hig
ghly
dependen
nt on the tra
aces’ conten
nts. HSR varries
significan
ntly from 0.6% for tracce 46 to 39.1%
for trace 52. This iss completely
y dependent on
the nature of packetts and attaccks within ea
ach
trace. To
o better und
derstand thiis, we focus on
traces 46
6 and 52, wiith the loweest and high
hest
savings, respectively
y. Figure 4 (b) shows the
access an
nd skip coun
nts for trace 52 for vary
ying
number of characterrs. It can be
b clearly seeen
that the HAC and HSC
H
counts increase as the
number of
o characterss increases, which
w
confirrms
the earlier finding reported
r
by Figure 3 (a).
(
Furtherm
more, we zoom in to one packet and
a
plot the HAC and HSC
H
versus varying
v
number
of characcters in Figu
ure 5 (a). The
T skip cou
unt
increases exponentially as th
he number of
characterrs in the paccket payload increases.
Beforre shifting our
o attention
n to measurring
runtime and speedu
up, which are easier for
readers to
t comprehen
nd, it is worrth mention
ning
that the preprocessing overh
head time is

ng Bloom vector
incurrred only once durin
progrramming. Th
he overhead resulting frrom the
queryy of Bloom ffilter search is too insign
nificant
to m
measure. We will discusss the preproocessing
overh
head in the next subseection. The search
time might be afffected by: th
he processorr speed,
memoory size and
d cache hierrarchy as w
well the
numb
ber of sign
natures used
d. To asseess the
worstt-case imp
provements, Figure 5 (b)
comp
pares Exhausst search tim
me to WM. W
We use
all S nort signatu
ures and prresent colum
mns for
each of the ten
n most malicious traces. On
averaage for all ttraces, Exhaaust is 33%
% faster
than WM, witth reported
d 5.972s rruntime
comp
pared to 8.9112s for WM.
F
Finally, Figgure 6 con
nfirms the earlier
findin
ngs that E
Exhaust is not affectted by
varyiing number of signaturres as oppoosed to
AC where runttime increaases linearly
y. The
figuree plots runttime for traaces 14 and 52 for
differrent number of signaturees. The savings are
consi stent with eearlier findings.
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Number of Sign
natures

Figure 3 (a). HAC and HSC for varyiing number of signatures
s
for ttrace 08; (b) HA
AR and HSR ffor varying num
mber of
signaturees for trace 08
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4.6. Preproce
essing ove
erhead
The Bloo
om filter inttroduces min
nimal overheead
in both the preproccessing and search stag
ges.
During preprocessing
p
g, there is th
he time to run
r
the aforeementioned hash
h
functio
ons and setting
the bits in the Blo
oom vector. Figure 7 (a)
comparess the preprocessing tim
me of Exha
aust
and WM
M for increassing numberr of signaturres.
The largeest measured
d overhead is 62ms, wh
hich
is equiv
valent to only
o
1.08% increase. On
average the overhead is 50m
ms, which is
equivalen
nt to 0.8% increase.
i
Th
he gap betweeen
the two curves
c
slighttly increases as the number
of signatures increasees. We can safely conclu
ude
that Ex
xhaust overrhead time is minima
ally
affected by
b increasing
g number off signatures.
To measure
m
thee memory usage
u
overheead
introduceed by the Bloom filteer we use MS
M
Windowss Task Manager to estimate the
memory consumed by
b Exhaust. Although the
numbers are bloated due to Windows
W
Task
Manager’s own overhead but th
hey still givee a
clear idea
a about the memory inccrease. Figurre 7
(b) comp
pares Exhausst and WM memory usa
age
in MB for
f
increasin
ng number of signaturres.
The mem
mory scaling
g is the sam
me for Exha
aust
and WM
M with lin
near increasse with more
m

© 2016 ADFSL
A

signaatures. The w
worst-case m
memory overrhead is
1,3088KB equivaalent to 0.333%. The aaverage
overh
head is 1,2855KB equivaleent to 0.32%
%.
T
To further p
prove that linear increease in
memoory usage w
with increasiing signaturres is a
good trend, Figgure 8 (a) plots the m
memory
usagee in MB ffor both E
Exhaust and
d AhoCorassick again
nst increassing numb
ber of
signaatures. Thee state ex
xplosion in AhoCorassick as the n
number of ssignatures in
ncrease,
resultts in a ssharper exp
ponential m
memory
increaase as can be clearly seen. Exhaaust is
superrior to AC when it ccomes to m
memory
scalin
ng.

4
4.7. Reduc
cing false positives
The filter provid
des 100% ccertainty (i.e. true
negattives), which
h saves exeecution timee. True
positiives (TP) arre not impoortant becau
use that
simplly means wee had to searrch the hash
h table.
It is important tto stress th
hat introduciing the
Bloom
m filter doees not affecct the accurracy of
WM. False posittives simply
y mean we do not
save on execution
n time. Figu
ure 8 (b) shoows the
FPs p
probability ggiven by Eq
q. (1) for inccreasing
numb
ber of signattures. For ssuch a large vector
the F
FPs probab
bility is inssignificant w
with a
-5
maxim
mum of 1 .
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Figure 7 (a). Preprocessing time of Exhaust and WM for varying number of signatures; (b) Memory usage for
Exhaust and WM for varying number of signatures
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Figure 8 (a). Memory usage for Exhaust compared to AC for varying number of signatures; (b) False positives
probability versus the number of signatures

4.8. Complexity Analysis
To illustrate the added complexity of Exhaust
algorithm, we must consider both the original
WM algorithm and the extra cost for adding
the Bloom filter. Let N be the size of the text,
P the number of patterns, m the size of one
pattern, k the number of hash functions used
in the Bloom filter, and assume that M=mP is
the total size of all patterns.
The size of a substring block B that is used
to address the shift table is defined as
B=logc2M, where c is the size of the alphabet.
In the preprocessing phase the shift table
construction time is O(M), since that each B
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block of any pattern is considered once and it
consumes constant time on average. On the
other hand, the Bloom filter programming time
is O(k) because each hash function is used to
address every programmed pattern. The search
phase time for WM in either the case of
nonzero shift value or the case of zero shift
value is O(BN/m), due to the suggested lemma
proofed by Wu and Manber which says, “The
probability that a random string of size B
leads to a shift value of i, 0≤ i ≤ m-B+1, is ≤ ½
m”, and the benefit from prefix table extra
filtering that makes the probability of false
positives extremely small. The complexity
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incurred from the Bloom filter querying is O(k)
(Wu, & Manber, 1994).

5. CONCLUSIONS
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Technology School of Graduate Studies and in
part by Zayed University Research Office,
Research Incentive Fund grant # R17060.

There exists a need to speed up intrusion
detection systems. The main bottleneck is the
pattern matching part of the problem. There
has been a lot of research into new pattern
matching algorithms and architectures for
speeding up intrusion detection. Hardware
architectures are fast, but they suffer from
high cost and power requirements as well as
configurability issues. Software based IDSs
remain more popular and dominate the IDSs
market, but increasing signatures requires
faster pattern matching. Wu-Manber is one of
the fastest multiple pattern matching
algorithms used for intrusion detection but
falls short of achieving the required speed.
We proposed Exhaust, a new modified WuManber based pattern matching algorithm for
intrusion detection systems. The new
algorithm benefits from Bloom filters exclusion
property to reduce the number of expensive
hash table searches. The hash table can grow
extremely large as the number of patterns
grows.
The metrics we use to evaluate the speedup
are the hash table skips ratio and execution
time. We evaluate the algorithm with worst
case traffic and find that Exhaust greatly
improves the speed of WM at minimal cost. At
best the hash table is skipped 39.1% of the
time and 10.6 % on average. Exhaust reduces
the running time by 33% on average for worst
case traffic. The worst-case preprocessing time
overhead is 1.1% and the memory overhead is
0.33%. We also show that the new algorithm
has insignificant false positives probability and
minor added complexity.
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